Abstract
This study examines duopoly price competition between a for-profit firm and a nonprofit organization. It shows that the competitive outcome is predominantly the consequence of their different objective functions. The damage to the for-profit caused by the nonprofit's policy and regulatory advantages is only marginal. Moreover, the for-profit can protect itself by acquiring Stackelberg price leadership.
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