Abstract
We study 33 pairs of advertising agencies that merged between 1947 and 1985, comparing each merging pair against two controls: (a) a pair of agencies with combined merger-date billings close to the total billings of the merged unit, and (b) a single agency with similar total merger-date billings. Gross revenues are the dependent variable. Results: Merging firms do worse in the short run than controls. Assuming similar subsequent rates of growth for merging and non-merging firms, a loss of 16 percent of firm value due to merging is implied.
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More From: International Journal of the Economics of Business
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