Abstract
AbstractCan an identity be the proper subject of an explanation? A popular stance, albeit not one often argued for, gives a negative answer to this question. Building from a contentious passage from Jaegwon Kim in this direction, we reconstruct an argument to the conclusion that identities, to the extent in which they are necessary, cannot be explained. The notion of contrastive explanation, characterized as difference‐seeking, will be crucial for this argument; however, we will eventually find the argument to be unsatisfactory. On the contrary, the discussion provides enough resources to sketch a very simple framework for a non‐causal contrastive explanation of identities. Many instances will be provided, with different varieties ofexplanans, ultimately suggesting that certain entailment or biconditional principles involving identities (first and foremost, so‐called two‐level identity criteria) may indeed be taken to have an inherent explanatory value.
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