Abstract
We show that voters are fiscal conservatives, although in the long run only: while the average (over the mandate) level of debt has a negative impact on the probability of reelection, pre-election debt accumulation by incumbents increases their probability of reelection. As the negative impact becomes larger as the debt level becomes higher, it compensates for the short run effect. Elections thus appear as a disciplining device, even if a weak one.
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