Abstract
Brewin and Burgess (2014) argue that our recent papers investigating the role of contextual representations in intrusive memories do not pose a challenge to dual-representation theory as originally claimed (Pearson, 2012; Pearson, Ross, & Webster, 2012). Here I point out that their alternative explanation for our results can be rejected using data already published in both papers. I also argue that their definition of what constitutes a contextual representation renders their revised dual-representation theory incompatible with experimental results that have previously been argued in the literature to support it. Valuable though their contribution is, it does not impact on our main conclusion that abstract contextual representations serve to increase intrusive memories for traumatic material.
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