Are all mutuals the same? Evidence from CEO turnover in the US property–casualty insurance industry

Abstract

Organizational form in insurance has been widely studied in the prior literature. Although researchers have recognized sub-types of stock insurers, mutuals have always been considered as a single homogeneous category. To the extent that mutual sub-types behave differently, considering all mutuals the same can result in misleading conclusions. The present study aims to remedy this gap in the literature by considering the full range of mutual firm types. Mutuals are classified as family-controlled, association-controlled, and pure mutuals with various sub-types within each group. We analyze corporate governance among mutual sub-types in the U.S. property–casualty (P–C) insurance industry by studying CEO turnover, particularly nonroutine turnover. Multinomial probit analysis is used to test for relationships between mutual sub-types and turnover. The principal finding is that all mutuals are not the same. The probability of nonroutine CEO turnover is lowest for family-controlled, non-association mutuals and highest for association-controlled mutuals. Non-association mutuals with family-member CEOs have the lowest turnover rates among all ownership types. Thus, future research should utilize more detailed organizational form categories than the traditional literature.