Abstract
This study examines the trading behavior of a large sample of individual (retail) investors around securities litigation events. We test the hypothesis that the response of these investors around the end of the litigation class period (at the time of a corrective disclosure) and the start of the class period (at the time of disclosure of allegedly false positive information) differs on the basis of the informedness of the investors. Our tests reject the hypothesis that more informed investors exhibit the same trading behavior as less informed investors. These results contribute to the literature by documenting differences in individual investor trading around events that reveal the start and end of an alleged financial fraud. These events can be relatively difficult to interpret and, so, it is not unreasonable that we should observe differences on the basis of informedness. We also examine individual investor trading within the class period and adduce that trading intensity is higher earlier in the class period, and higher overall relative to a control period. These findings are inconsistent with the often-applied proportional trading model for the calculation of class action damages, which assumes all shares trade with equal probability.
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