Abstract
Humans possess efficient mechanisms to behave adaptively in social contexts. They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and use these for behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate mental attribution systems: an implicit and automatic one involved in online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline deliberations. However, the underlying mechanisms of these systems and the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still unclear. Using neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal junction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions consistently found to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also recruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While the medial prefrontal cortex was more active when both the participant and another agent believed an object to be at a specific location, the right temporo-parietal junction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs of another agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects. While humans can explicitly attribute to a conspecific any possible belief they themselves can entertain, implicit belief tracking seems to be restricted to beliefs with specific contents, a content selectivity that may reflect a crucial functional characteristic and signature property of implicit belief attribution.
Highlights
To successfully participate in social interactions, one must take into account that people are guided by mental states, such as desires and beliefs
We carried out signal-change analyses in the a-priori defined region of interest (ROI) based on a meta-analysis of peaks reported in 26 studies on mentalizing
One question was related to the neural mechanism of implicit theory of mind’’ (ToM), and the other concerned the potential content selectivity of the implicit system
Summary
To successfully participate in social interactions, one must take into account that people are guided by mental states, such as desires and beliefs Such ‘‘theory of mind’’ (ToM) abilities allow us to predict and interpret others’ behavior based on attributed mental states. According to a recent proposal the implicit ToM system employs different representations than does the explicit system [1] Such ‘two-system’ approaches assume that automatic ToM relies on cognitive processes that are distinct from those employed by explicit mechanisms that are manifested in judgments of veridicality of others’ beliefs. In this view, only the latter can be considered proper ToM, while the implicit system is considered as a precursor. While there is extensive behavioral and neuroimaging research on explicit ToM, the functional properties and the underlying neural mechanisms of implicit ToM are less clear
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