Abstract
Ronald Dworkin has accused legal theorists who use a descriptive methodology (positivists such as H.L.A. Hart) and many modern metaethicists of archimedeanism, attempting to analyze and assess their subject matter while standing outside of it and claiming not to make any value judgments about it. Dworkin believes that there are only three possible understandings of description and that none can apply to what the metaethicists and legal positivists are trying to do. I show that Dworkin's understandings of descriptive methodology are either misguided or incomplete and that metaethicists and legal positivists are describing institutional facts or are explaining concepts. I also show that Dworkin's particular attacks on external skepticism and metaethics are misplaced.
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