Arbitrators’ suspicion of money laundering: choices against principles

Abstract

PurposeThis paper aims to examine the options available to arbitrators when they suspect money laundering during arbitration proceedings, considering their compatibility with fundamental principles and concepts of arbitration.Design/methodology/approachUsing a doctrinal analysis approach, the paper draws on legal principles, antimoney laundering regulations and relevant literature to explore the topic. It considers relevant international treaties, standards set by the financial action task force on money laundering, cases and arguments from legal analysts and experts.FindingsThe paper identifies three options for arbitrators: disregarding suspicions, initiating an investigation or terminating the proceedings. Disregarding suspicions is deemed inappropriate, as it may facilitate the concealment of financial crimes. Initiating an investigation is seen as a preferable option, aligning with the arbitrator’s role and the public interest in nullifying contracts linked to criminal conduct. Terminating the proceedings is not recommended, as it contradicts the principle of natural justice. The paper emphasizes the importance of reasonable grounds for suspicions, notifying the parties, and allowing them to address the concerns.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the existing literature by comprehensively analyzing the compatibility of these options with arbitration principles and concepts. It underscores the need for clear laws and directives to guide arbitrators in addressing financial crimes within the arbitration process, maintaining a balance between party autonomy and preventing the misuse of arbitration for illicit activities.