Arbitrariness of Social and Natural Differences: Luck, Lottery, and Equality

Abstract

It is sometimes argued that social and natural inequalities which are both arbitrary from a moral point of view should nevertheless have a different moral status in a theory of justice: while inequalities of a social type should be rightfully neutralized, the effects of natural inequalities should be respected, because they are a component of individual identity, in a way that social inequalities are not. This paper argues against such a distinction. It first clarifies the notion of natural lottery; it then draws a distinction between the notion of self-ownership and the extensions of one's rights over one's body. Subsequently, it argues that the appeal to competing conceptions of the self is not helpful in this context, because a thick conception of the self is a proxy for a particular normative conception of justice, rather than a metaphysical presupposition for theories of justice. The paper concludes by suggesting an interpretation of the metaphor of a common pool of natural abilities that would not be intrusive so as to effectively respect the separate identity of individuals.