Abstract

Adopting a resource dependence viewpoint, this study investigates how the arbitrariness of corruption in a host country affects subsidiary performance. Analysis of bank foreign affiliates in 37 host countries shows that the negative effect of arbitrariness on affiliate performance is positively moderated by the strength of the sub-unit's corporate link, and the average number of expatriate managers appointed at the sub-unit. This study extends the literature on corruption by exploring a subtle but damaging dimension for foreign entrants and provides cues to managers for the proactive measures to take when they are likely to experience the arbitrariness of corruption.

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