Arab unity of action and the Palestine question, 1945–48

Abstract

The idea that joint Arab action could solve the Palestine problem dominated Palestinian Arab thinking from the beginning of the Palestinian struggle for independence. In the earliest stages, during the 1920s, Palestinian Arab leaders made numerous and varied attempts to elicit moral and material support from their Arab neighbours. Thus, for example, in their many visits to Arab countries they advocated the need for pan-Arab and pan-Islamic solidarity and unity and emphasized the Islamic religious importance of Jerusalem. Led by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Palestinian Arab leadership alleged that the Jews were contemplating devious designs to usurp al-Buraq al-Sharif the Western or Wailing Wall. In 1929, serious disturbances broke out in Palestine following these allegations, and in 1930 the Arab leaders in Palestine invited Muslim dignitaries from Arab and Islamic countries to defend Muslim ownership of the Buraq before the International Wailing Wall Commission, which had been formed following the disturbances. A year later the Grand Mufti invited hundreds of dignitaries from Islamic countries to take part in a General Islamic Congress in Jerusalem. The Congress set up a Permanent Secretariat, with members from Egypt, Palestine and Iran, to supervise fund raising in the Arab and Islamic world for the restoration of Islamic shrines in Palestine and the construction of an Islamic University in Jerusalem.' Until 1936, however, Arab and Islamic response to Palestinian Arab appeals for aid and support was small. The leaders of the national movements in the Arab world were engaged in their own national struggles, and thus paid very little attention to external problems. The mandatory Powers, France and Britain, also discouraged inter-Arab relations and restricted Arab cooperation to technical issues, such as border settlements and extradition agreements. Consequently, general Arab interest in the Palestine conflict was negligible, and the sundry campaigns waged by the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic societies failed to draw either public or governmental support for the Palestinian Arabs. This state of affairs changed dramatically during the so-called Arab Revolt, which erupted in Palestine in April 1936. Arab rulers, especially in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, responded favourably to the Palestinian Arab appeals for help, and manifested a keen interest in mediating the Arab conflict with the British. This was inspired less by Muslim and Arab feelings of solidarity, than by practical considerations; having already obtained independence for their states, and established their own positions in their countries, the Arab rulers expected that successful mediation in the Palestine conflict would win them British gratitude in the form of effective support on the local and regional levels. British support was considered vital