Aquinas on Mind (review)

Abstract

338 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:z APRIL 1995 characterize philosophers during this period, and one sometimes wonders how useful it is to attempt such characterization. Suhrawardi's connection with Peripateticism seems to be close, and yet it is far from clear that his Illuminationist philosophy is very distant from his Peripateticism. Since the latter was thoroughly mediated by Neoplatonism , it was always a rather unstable mixture of Aristotelian and Platonic doctrines, and as such could be taken in a variety of ways. What Qu.tb al-Din managed to do with Suhrawardi's ontology is adapt it so that it could incorporate science. According to the latter, everything which is not a concrete individual is a mental abstraction, with the implication that the regularities which we observe in the world may be nothing more than arbitrary combinations of ideas. Qu.tb al-Din, who was after all mainly a scientist, managed to avoid this conclusion by identifying the formal aspect of our experience with the Platonic Forms and relating these to angels who keep species in existence through their position in the order of existence as abstract intellects. He goes on to develop Suhrawardi's account of the realm of visions, imagination, and dreams in such a way as to render it capable of analytical treatment. Since both Avicenna and Suhrawardi argue that the world of images constitutes yet another epistemological realm in addition to the worlds of body, soul, and intellect, this realm should be capable of philosophical clarification, and it is precisely this which Qu.tb M-DIn provides . The short essay which Walbridge translates deals with this issue, and reveals the considerable philosophical skills which its author could deploy. Although Qu.tb al-Din is working in an area replete with mystical language, he does not abandon the task of trying to understand analytically where the language of images is taking us. His main contribution is shown to be converting the esoteric into the exoteric, bringing mystical language closer to ordinary language, and so questioning the nature of the esoteric as a distinctive approach. This is an impressive book, and John Walbridge is to be congratulated for having clarified such a difficult yet rewarding set of ideas in the history of Islamic philosophy. OLIVER LEAMAN LiverpoolJohn Moores University Anthony Kenny. Aquinas on Mind. New York: Routledge, 1993. Topics in Medieval Philosophy. Pp. ii + a82. Cloth, $35.oo. In Aquinas on Mind, Anthony Kenny offers an interpretation of Aquinas's philosophy of mind based principally on a reading of the section of the Summa theologiaetraditionally referred to as the "Treatise on Man," that is, questions 75 through 89 of the prima pars (although the last two questions are omitted on the grounds that their concerns are principally theological). The book opens with Kenny's reflections on the relevance of Aquinas's philosophy of mind for contemporary philosophers; the second chapter provides the reader with an overview of some of the basic principles of Aristotelian metaphysics which come into play in Aquinas's philosophy; and the remaining chapters are devoted to the analysis of the texts themselves. Chapter 3 is devoted to perception and imagination (q. 78), chapter 4 to the intellecual powers (q. 79), chapters 5 and BOOK REVIEWS 339 6 to will and appetite (qq. 8o-83), chapters 7 through 9 to Aquinas's account of how we know the physical world (qq. 84-86 ), and chapter 1o to the problem of self-knowledge (q. 87). Kenny concludes with two chapters on Aquinas's general account of the soul and its relation to the body (qq. 75-76). While a few references to other relevant texts of Aquinas are made in the course of Kenny's work, by and large Kenny confines himself to what can be gleaned of Aquinas's views from this series of articles alone. Kenny's opening chapter defending the relevance of Aquinas's views for contemporary philosophers presents a generally convincing and eloquent case for the study of the history of philosophy, arguing against the claim that there is progress in all areas of philosophical endeavor. Kenny does admit that certain aspects of the history of philosophy have been...