Abstract

The draft Anticorruption Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (APUNCAC) seeks to implement aggressive measures to fight corruption and impunity, including United Nations inspectors who would conduct independent investigations into allegations of corruption and hand cases to dedicated domestic anticorruption courts. APUNCAC is designed to be a free-standing proposal. However, it could be combined with Judge Mark Wolf’s proposal for an International Anti-Corruption Court (IACC). An advantage of combining IACC + APUNCAC is that the combination defuses the key arguments against the IACC. This article reviews evidence suggesting that leaders of nations that currently experience endemic corruption might find it politically expedient to adopt the proposed reforms. The article discusses the advantages of combining IACC + APUNCAC. The combination would establish an independent corps of elite investigators, endow them with strong powers to conduct independent investigations, and enable them to refer cases to dedicated anticorruption courts staffed by judges vetted by the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. APUNCAC establishes mechanisms to ensure accountability of judges serving dedicated anticorruption courts. By addressing the key arguments against the IACC, the proposal to combine IACC + APUNCAC may enable broad public support in nations that would require public support in order to secure ratification.

Highlights

  • Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.The Anticorruption Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (APUNCAC) is a draft 200-page international convention developed by the author over the past decade (Yeh 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, forthcoming).1 The objective is to fill gaps in the existing international legal framework that fights corruption

  • The existing framework does not establish an international corps of anticorruption inspectors that are independent of manipulation by domestic elites, does not establish a system of dedicated anticorruption courts, does not ensure the integrity of prosecutors and judges who serve those courts, and does not install an effective system to collect and centralize accurate beneficial owner information whenever funds are transmitted internationally or to known bank secrecy havens in amounts exceeding USD 3000.2 APUNCAC contains provisions that would address each of these gaps

  • Similar to the Rome Statute, the CICIG Agreement, the agreement establishing the Honduran MACCIH, the law establishing Ukraine’s anticorruption court, the 2003 Romanian anticorruption laws, and every strong measure establishing independent prosecutors endowed with strong powers to investigate corruption in England, Europe, and America over the past 150 years, APUNCAC would rely on domestic and/or international pressure to force the hand of political leaders who might otherwise oppose APUNCAC

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Summary

Introduction

Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. The creation of dedicated domestic anticorruption courts is different from Judge Mark Wolf’s proposal to create a single International Anti-Corruption Court (IACC). Both are based on the rationale that endemic corruption can only be addressed by establishing independent investigators, prosecutors, and courts Both proposals raise thorny questions about why political leaders who themselves may be involved in corruption would ever support or sign the necessary agreements or legislation. Wolf argued that the United States system of independent courts and prosecutors offers a promising model: The United States provides a model for a new international approach to creating the crucial, credible threat that corrupt leaders will be punished for their crimes. It is expected that a resolution will be introduced regarding the IACC at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly to be held 26–28 April, 2021 at United Nations Headquarters in New York

Criticism 1
Criticism 2
Criticism 3
Responses
Lessons from America
Lessons from Romania and the UK
Findings
Conclusions
Full Text
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