Abstract
Under relatively weak conditions on the information structure of a game it is shown that any mixed strategy of a player can be replaced by a certain pure strategy without affecting any player’s expected payoff appreciably, no matter what strategies the other players use. Under even weaker conditions the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies is shown to guarantee the existence of a pure-strategy combination which is an approximate equilibrium.
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