Abstract
We study CEO successions in China and focus on the decision to appoint outsiders as CEOs. In doing so, we also differentiate our sample into SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and non-SOEs. We find that firm-specific factors can predict external successions for SOEs, but not for non-SOEs. Further, for those SOEs that choose outsiders as CEOs for firm-specific reasons, their subsequent firm performance improves.
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