Abstract
We study targeted redistribution by appointed state cabinet members (ministers) in Germany. Matching data on state ministers’ place of residence and state government employment data for the universe of western German municipalities for 1994–2013, we show within a difference-in-differences framework that municipalities that are the residence of a minister experience a higher annual growth rate in state government employment if they retain this status for more than one legislative term. Thus, our results suggest that appointed cabinet members engage in hometown favoritism. We discuss several potential mechanisms for this behavior.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
