Applying Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls

Abstract

There is good reason to believe that rational choice approaches can be usefully applied to the study of international law (IL). The law and economics tradition has brought rational choice insights and analysis to bear on domestic legal affairs, and political scientists in the international relations (IR) field have applied rational choice approaches—especially game theory, expected utility theory, and transaction cost economics—with great success. Indeed, given these movements in IL’s sister fields of domestic law and IR, one puzzle is why it has taken so long for international lawyers to turn to rational choice theory. Most IL scholarship has focused on describing the nature and sources of law and defending its legitimacy. However, with the growth of international law and economics, and increasing cross-fertilization between IL and IR, the scholarly landscape is beginning to change in ways that will benefit the study of international legal behavior and institutions. Rational choice offers a promising foundation—including a coherent set of