Abstract

School choice mechanisms are used to determine how to assign students to the public schools. These mechanisms take into account the students preferences order and the schools priority order to calculate an assignment that meets the needs and preferences of both students and schools. This paper sketches the school choice problem and its real-life condition in some cities, discusses the theory background of school choice problem and its specialty as a one-side matching problem. Also, this paper introduces the Defer Acceptance (DA) mechanism, the Top Trading Cycle (TTC) mechanism, the Boston (BOS) mechanism and the Serial Dictatorship (SD) mechanism. The paper analyzes four different mechanisms desirable properties, including strategy-proofness, stability and Pareto efficiency. Meanwhile, the flaws of the mechanisms are introduced. At last, based on the analysis and the purpose of improving students welfare, the paper raises some suggestion for the government, schools and parents, ensuring the students a transparent, fair and equal environment of choosing their schools.

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