Application of the concept of collective dominance in the Russian competition law: challenges and solutions

Igor Bashlakov-Nikolaev,Sergey Maximov,D Rudoy,V Kankhva,A Olshevskaya

doi:10.1051/e3sconf/202021013030

Abstract

The Russian competition law does not include the definition of the concept of collective dominance, and the notion of this institution itself contains many gaps. The indicated disadvantages of statutory regulation and simplified approaches of the Federal Antimonopoly Service, which became possible due to the formal approach, have led to the formation of controversial law enforcement practice by the antimonopoly authority and courts. The article presents the analysis of legal regulation, as well as the law enforcement practice, and proposition on solutions to the stated problems.

Highlights

Due to the high requirements for proving the existence of a cartel and concerted actions that restrict competition, the law enforcement agency considers the collective dominance in an oligopolistic market to be a tacit collusion that does not require special proof [1]
The scientific literature indicates that when there is an allegation of abuse of a dominant position in collective dominance, the antimonopoly authority does not examine the relations between its participants and the individual behavior of economic units is evaluated independently of behavior of other participants of the dominance [2]
The analysis demonstrates that the content of the institution of collective dominance, which is contained and used in Part 1 Article 5 of the Law on Protection of Competition, is specified and disclosed in Part 3 of this Article through the same features that denote the content of the concept of a dominant position of an economic unit or, the so-called single firm dominance

Summary

Introduction

Due to the high requirements for proving the existence of a cartel and concerted actions that restrict competition, the law enforcement agency considers the collective dominance in an oligopolistic market to be a tacit collusion that does not require special proof [1]. The considered conditions that are contained in the Russian competition law do not characterize the actions and market power of economic units that are part of the collective dominance, but the commodity market This approach, which involves establishing collective dominance on the basis of objective data on commodity markets without determining the subjective behavior of the participants of collective dominance, leading to each participant of collective dominance separately achieving the market power, that allows to have a onesided impact on commodity's circulation in the commodity market, has signs of strict liability. The cooperation enables the penalty for those who refuse to follow the common strategy of collective dominance, that leads to the achievement of the market power through the restriction of competition between the participants of collective dominance

Methods

Results

Discussion

Conclusion