Abstract
Nature reserves (NRs) are complex social-ecological systems (SESs). In China, many collective forests (CFs), owned by villagers, are bound within NRs. This paper aimed at carrying out a dynamic analysis of three case studies of CF management based on Ostrom’s SES conceptual framework. The hybrid psycho-economic model is designed within this context and tested. Results indicate that CF management is determined jointly by the interaction of all levels of governance based on subsystem characteristics (i.e., resource system, resource units, and actor system) specific to the local social, economic, and political settings. Use of the hybrid psycho-economic model compares one classified harmonious NR scenario with two conflictual ones. The model indicated the scenario with the harmonious NR as having less CF value at the resource level, less dependence on villagers for CF resources, stronger environmental awareness, lower levels of involvement from new actors, overarching governance control (i.e., by the NR administration), greater levels of self-organization (i.e., within villages), and augmented economic compensation and regulation from outside influences. The conflict-oriented NRs mostly revealed opposite sets of interaction. Different public policies, including the ecosystem service payment, are recommended for improving management of CFs in NRs.
Highlights
Nature reserves (NRs) dominate protected areas in China
collective forests (CFs) management is a core part of NR social-ecological systems (SESs) management; it is an ongoing interactional process in which outcomes are determined jointly by the interactions at all levels of governance in the context of the specified social, economic, and political settings
In DNR, local villagers had a high dependence on indirect use of the CF for tourism and cash income (AS8c), which meant less reliance on bamboo and other nature-based products (NBPs) for cash income and subsistence (A8a, AS8b)
Summary
Nature reserves (NRs) dominate protected areas in China. Prior to the 1990s, almost all NRs were managed in isolation, failing to incorporate local people or their interests [8,9]. This has created a negative attitude toward conservation among villagers and backlash from some engaged in the destruction of natural resources at the NR level [10,11]. Community-based co-management (CBCM) projects introduced in the mid-1990s (i.e., to conserve biodiversity, sustain the use of natural resources, and promote socioeconomic development of NRs and their surrounding villages) became the norm [8,14,15]. Widespread criticism suggests that, in practice, CBCM tends to gloss over the institutional complexities posed by the management of common-pool resources [17]
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