Abstract
Abstract The closed-closed-loop supply chain is a complex system with many uncertain factors, but it is certain that the gains of the participants in the system after the formation of a coalition are greater than the gains without cooperation. In the process of applying the cooperative game model to get an income allocation scheme which maintains a stable coalition, the researchers of this paper found that classical solutions to cooperative games - Shapley values suffer unreasonable high uncertainty. Therefore, this paper modifies the Shapley value method, and then uses the modified method to solve the allocation problem of the closed-loop supply chain under the third-party reclaim mode. The results show that the modified Shapley value has lower uncertainty. © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of RIUDS
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