Appetites and Emotions (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Part I, Question 81, Articles 2-3)

Abstract

In Thomas Aquinas’ theory of emotions, emotions (or ‘passiones,’ as they are called in Latin) are embedded in a larger psychological framework. They are features (or acts) of so-called appetitive powers. Contrary to apprehensive powers, which make a being cognitively apprehend something, appetitive powers make a being strive for something. They are further divided into sensory and intellective. Sensory appetite, in turn, is divided into concupiscible and irascible. As Aquinas makes clear in the passage of the Summa theologiae translated in the following, an appetite is concupiscible if the object is simply good or bad or, differently speaking, if it is easily attained or rejected. An appetite is irascible if the object is arduous, that is, if it is not so easily attained or rejected. Consequently, Aquinas classifies emotions depending on the appetite to which they belong. Enjoyment, for instance, is brought about by the concupiscible appetite. Hope and despair are irascible emotions. Thus, the answers he gives to the question of whether nonhuman animals have emotions are based on this fundamental psychological distinction.