“Appearing As Such” in Patocka’s A-Subjective Phenomenology

Abstract

According to Patocka, problem of defines most original task of philosophy. Philosophy, he thinks, was born when this peculiar fact was revealed to men: that beings not only are, but more essentially appear. In other words, original wondering about being of beings (why are there beings at all, rather than nothing?) presupposes that beings have already appeared themselves in their act of being. ' Being itself is something that appears in act of making or letting beings be, even if this withdraws from die beings and cannot be reduced to any objective or thematic phenomenon.2 The being of beings consists in and task of philosophy is to describe this it is such, general a priori structure grounding any of any being whatsoever. Appearing as such is therefore not being. It is radier of being. It is not a question of dealing wim, Patocka insists several times, the being (das Erscheinende) but with the {das Erscheinen), of being (das Erscheinen des Erscheinenden).3 As long we attempt to analyze through this or that particular thing-as exemplary or eminent we want it to be-it lays concealed and obliterated behind me thing. The first step to approach is, then, to recognize its essential difference with regard to being. Appearing is not an being (appearing is not a being [Seiendes]),4 i.e., it does not appear (only beings appear). This means that such is an in me verbal and not in substantial sense of die word; it is not phainomenon, but die phainesthai of phainomenon. Appearing is die action or die movement which brings thing into its appearing; it is not another being (a cause of appearing), but very coming-into-appearing or very arrival-into-appearing (in-Erscheinung-Treten) of beings. Phenomenology-i.e., philosophy in its most authentic form, since being is essentially appearing-is aprioristic concerning essential laws of die of beings.5 According to Patocka, modern philosophy had begun to recover tiiis program of thinking only with Husserl's logical Investigations. Indeed, re-directing our observation from objects and tiieir objectivity toward how of tiieir apparition or toward tiieir modes of appearing, Husserl had discovered realm of phenomenon, realm of apparition in its which philosophical tradition until then had never brought into view such, but each time reconverted to structures of being in its particularity.6 Phenomenology attempts to discover of phenomena in general; phenomenology is-to put it in terms of The Idea of Phenomenology, often quoted by Patocka-the science of phenomena.7 Pure means here, above all, mat has to be purified from beings and from their objectivity. The pure appearing of phenomena is their manifestation purged of all objective positing,8 their simple or in its essential difference from any being. All mis represents however only initial impulse of phenomenology. Very soon, Husserl's work - precisely from The Idea of Phenomenology on, we will see-will take a turn in which this original task, along witii such, will be forgotten. It is true that, for Patocka, Husserl will never totally abandon mis problematic, not even in end (especially not in end).9 But after die Logical Investigations, a period begins in which thought of what constitutes me most peculiar characteristic of such-its difference with regard to beings-will be missed: Husserl couldn't entirely formulate this difference (even though he had it in mind). …