Apec after Shanghai

Abstract

WHEN THE LEADERS OF Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) held their ninth annual meeting on 20-21 October 2001 the conditions were sharply different than those under which the gathering was first planned. Prior to 11 September, the priority was increased economic interdependence in the region. For the host country, China, the event was an opportunity to showcase its economic reforms and its rising place on the regional and world stages, as reflected in its admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Beijing's selection as the site of the 2008 Olympics. China's chosen theme for APEC 2001 reflected that economic fixation: 'Meeting new challenges in a new century: achieving common prosperity through participation and cooperation,' with sub-themes of 'Sharing the benefits of globalization and the new economy,' 'Advancing trade and investment,' and 'Promoting sustained economic growth.'Instead, as one official subsequently put it, 'we were hijacked by terrorism.' For the first time, geopolitical security issues - the control of (inter-state) violence and the promotion of physical safety - had an explicit section in APEC's official communique and demanded action on the part of the member economies.(1) This raises questions about the scope of APEC. Does this one instance set a precedent for broadening the organization's mandate to include geopolitical matters, such as military (im)balances and local flashpoints? And, if so, would this reinvigorate flagging confidence in APEC, as indicated by the sardonic comment that the acronym really stands for 'A Perfect Excuse to Chat'? Or, in contrast, can APEC renew its original economic agenda? With the administration of George W. Bush in the United States shifting its security focus away from Europe and toward Asia as part of its long-term strategy before 11 September, including the transfer of 65,000 soldiers there,(2) the possibility of grafting a 'high politics' security-oriented mandate onto APEC is even more relevant.The limelight at Shanghai was certainly hijacked by the terrorist attacks and the response to them. Even so, APEC's three pillars of trade liberalization, trade facilitation, and economic and technical co-operation each recorded some modest progress in the background. The Shanghai meeting also addressed some 'newer' issues of interdependence, particularly human capacity building in the new economy, a key theme on China's agenda, and the integration of greater public participation in APEC agenda-setting through a Dialogue on Globalization and Shared Prosperity, which took place in May 2002. All of these initiatives present potential avenues for the engagement of civil society.Nonetheless, thirteen years after it was first formed, questions about 'What is APEC?' and 'What is APEC for?' still remain. Gareth Evans, a former Australian foreign minister, once called it 'four adjectives in search of a noun,' with 'forum' usually tacked on at the end. Now one of the most important of the four words, 'economic,' appears to have lost its hold on APEC's agenda.One useful function of APEC is as a 'clearinghouse' for other international matters or a network of actors who may use its annual leaders' meeting for incidental purposes, rather than an actor in and of itself. The 2001 Statement on Counter-terrorism is the most prominent example, but leaders also used the Shanghai meeting to comment on other international and regional events, such as the WTO meeting in Doha, the Chiang Mai initiative for currency stabilization in Asia, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.Another central function of APEC is its bilateral meetings. Bilateral free trade agreements, such as the negotiations launched by Canada's Prime Minister Jean Chretien and Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong,(3) are advanced through encounters on the margins of the APEC summits, although they tend to show up the sluggish progress toward Asia Pacific free trade. …