Abstract
Antitrust legislation and enforcement has over the last few decades been increasingly informed by ever more sophisticated analysis while—at the same time—evidence has continued to mount that the results of antitrust remedies fall far short of the promises held out under still prevalent ‘nirvana fallacy’ (Demsetz in Journal of Law and Economics 12(1):1–22, 1969) expectations. I draw upon a recent Supreme Court decision as well as the results of Young and Shughart’s (Public Choice, 2010. doi:10.1007/s11127_009-9531-y) novel approach to the analysis of antitrust enforcement activities to discuss the extent to which public choice theory is vital in solving the puzzle regarding the “unintended” effects of antitrust (public) choices.
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