Abstract

A number of developing countries around the world have recently liberalized once highly protected regimes through privatization programs and by reducing impediments to market trade. Many of these countries have adopted an antitrust policy as an integral component of their market reforms. Recent assessments of trade liberalization programs show disappointing results. Such outcomes contradict long-held beliefs that free trade is sufficient to generate competitive outcomes in small economies. Antitrust advocates view these underwhelming achievements as further justification for extensive antitrust enforcement. We argue instead that the failure of liberalization suggests not the correctness but the inappropriateness of the enactment of antitrust policies. The continuance of market power after liberalization is due primarily to lobbying activities by producer interest groups to establish nontariff barriers rather than to collusive practices among producers. Interest groups find cartelization and rent seeking a...

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