Anti-realism in the philosophy of probability: Bruno de Finetti's subjectivism

Abstract

Bruno de Finetti is known as an upholder of that subjectivistic view of probability, whose first extensive formulation is generally ascribed to F. P. Ramsey, and whose popularity is associated with the work of L. J. Savage. His view is thought of as opposed to frequentism, but related to the classical, and sometimes also the logical interpretation of probability. In fact, de Finetti puts forward a conception of probability that is not only incompatible with any perspective based on an objective notion, but cannot be assimilated to other subjective views of prob? ability either. Such a totally original view is the expression of a specific philosophy of probability. This can be qualified as a combination of empiricism and pragmatism within an entirely coherent anti-realistic perspective. The purpose of the following pages is precisely that of clarifying the central features of such a philosophical position. First, de Finetti's notion of subjective probability will be recalled and contrasted with other subjective views of probability. This will be followed by a recollection of the main criticisms he raised against classical, frequen tist and logical interpretations.