Antimonopoly Restrictions of the Share of Retail Chains in the Food Market

Abstract

The paper deals with the problems of efficiency of the mechanism of antimonopoly restrictions imposed on the share of retail networks that sell food products on the market. Based on the analysis of judicial and law enforcement practice of antimonopoly authorities, the author concludes that, despite restrictions established by the anticompetitive legislation on the 25% market share, retail networks in the market often occupy a much larger share due to both the imperfection of the legislation and application by trading networks of various ways to circumvent the law. In order to improve the efficiency of antimonopoly regulation in the retail food market, the author proposes to move from a prohibitive mechanism to a preventive mechanism of regulation, to remove restrictions on the maximum share of the retail network in the market but, at the same time, to oblige retail networks that occupy a dominant position in the market or exercise collective dominance, not to create discriminatory conditions for suppliers representing small and medium-sized businesses, including local producers.