Abstract
I argue for the unexceptionality of evidence about what rationality requires. Specifically, I argue that, as for other topics, one’s total evidence can sometimes support false beliefs about this. Despite being prima facie innocuous, a number of philosophers have recently denied this. Some have argued that the facts about what rationality requires are highly dependent on the agent’s situation and change depending on what that situation is like (Bradley, Philosophers’ Imprint, 19(3). 2019). Others have argued that a particular subset of normative truths, those concerning what epistemic rationality requires, have the special property of being ‘fixed points’—it is impossible to have total evidence that supports false belief about them (Smithies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85(2). 2012; Titelbaum 2015). Each of these kinds of exceptionality permits a solution to downstream theoretical problems that arise from the possibility of evidence supporting false belief about requirements of rationality. However, as I argue here, they incur heavy explanatory burdens that we should avoid.
Highlights
I argue for the unexceptionality of evidence about what rationality requires
Regardless of which option is correct, the propositional justification that Assets says we have plays very little role in determining what you should believe, given your situation. This suggests that Sufficiency is false—Assets cannot rule out evidential situations that require false beliefs in what rationality requires - they are inert
The Simple View says that cases of apparently misleading evidence about what rationality requires are just ordinary cases of one’s evidence supporting a false belief - evidence can support false belief about any topic, including what rationality requires
Summary
Evidence can support false belief about all kinds of subject matters. The Simple View says that what rationality requires is a subject matter like any other, and so something that evidence can support false belief about. Response to instances of the Liar Paradox.2 He well-meaningly introduces you to all the best arguments for dialetheism, some paraconsistent logic, and some unconvincing challenges to dialetheism. You lack the capacity to refute any of this evidence None of this changes the facts about what rationality requires—rationality still requires that you avoid contradictory belief. The extent of apparently reasonable disagreement about what rationality requires suggests that false belief about what rationality requires is common and that it is often evidentially supported. This simple explanation is ruled out by the Impossibility Thesis. As I argue neither of the ways of defending the Impossibility Thesis offers an adequate alternative explanation of situations like Logic 101
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