Abstract
Abstract Reformers have offered many proposals for changing the Senate filibuster, ranging from modest adjustments to outright abolition. I draw on formal models of obstruction in legislatures to analyze the consequences of three such proposals: creating an opportunity to close debate with a simple majority vote after a sufficiently long floor debate, making it more onerous for the minority to sustain filibusters, and outright abolishing the filibuster. In each of these cases, the models offer a more complete understanding of the effects of these proposals.
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