Anticipating the Biden Doctrine for the Korean Peninsula

Abstract

Since the Biden administration took office, its approach and strategy for domestic and foreign affairs have become the focus of global attention. The new administration’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula is one of the most heatedly debated subjects among policymakers and pundits. The past four years have seen major changes in regional security architecture, the most noticeable of which are dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and intensified China-U.S. strategic rivalry. In this context, a comprehensive overhaul of Mr. Trump’s approach to global affairs is expected under a Democratic administration staffed with foreign policy veterans, and the Korean Peninsula policy will be among the most consequential decisions for Biden’s White House. President Biden’s policy toward Pyongyang will be substantially different from Trump’s approach. A bottom-up, incremental model is likely to replace Trump’s personalized diplomacy marked by flashy summit meetings and “love letters.” Existing sanctions will be maintained until the Biden administration sees substantive results regarding the North’s nuclear and missile arsenal. While keeping up the pressure to coerce Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, President Biden is expected to respond more proactively to Kim Jong-un’s overtures or “provocations” and place a high premium on policy reciprocity. The Biden team will elevate the role of Seoul and Tokyo in its strategic planning and increase trilateral coordination and consultation. Stiff competition is more likely to hinder China-U.S. coordination on the Peninsula. The tone, substance, and results of diplomatic engagement between Beijing and Washington over the nuclear issue in the early days of the new administration will give a foretaste of what could ensue on the Peninsula. Positive initial interactions may generate broader implications for China-U.S. relations, regional stability, and global security at large.