Anti-Luminous Mental States: Logical, Psychological and Epistemic Problems

Óscar L González-Castán

doi:10.1007/s12136-021-00473-1

Abstract

In this paper I shall argue that Tim Williamson’s argument for the anti-luminosity of many mental states faces difficult logical, psychological and epistemological problems. From a logical point of view, his argument is correct. However, the contrary argument that says that the anti-luminosity thesis does not necessarily follow from it is also correct. This opens a sceptical scenario. Hence, if Williamson wants to convince us that we should rationally prefer his argument rather than the other, he needs to add considerations that are not merely logical. These are psychological and epistemological in nature. However, none of these considerations is convincing.

Highlights

Tim Williamson has argued that many mental states are non-luminous
Williamson has tried to argue that many mental states, probably millions, are non-luminous, he has not tackled in detail two questions that might spontaneously be asked about his position
Williamson has put forward a logical argument to defend that many mental states are non-luminous

Summary

Introduction

Tim Williamson has argued that many mental states are non-luminous. This means that we might have them, in the sense of experiencing them, we are not in a position to know what we are experiencing through them and even that we are experiencing them. This intentional analysis leads us to distinguish in a seemingly uncontroversial way between the type of mental state we are currently in—feeling but not remembering—and its mental content, whether qualitative or conceptual—feeling cold but not hot We usually know both things with absolute evidence or, at least, confidence. What makes Williamson’s challenge philosophically appealing is that the mental states he is thinking about are not unconscious in any strong sense of the word, as this notion has often been used in the philosophy of mind They are neither sub-personal computational or neurological states nor presently unconscious but potentially conscious ones.

The Anti-luminosity Argument

An Impossible Decision to Be Made on Logical Considerations

The Language

Second Deduction—Axiom

Reflective Meta-knowledge and Its Limits

Conclusion