ANTI-HYBRID MISMATCH PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN TAX LEGISLATIONS AND THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TAX CERTAINTY PRINCIPLE

Abstract

Hybrid mismatch arrangements are means of structuring cross-border transactions which result into double taxation or double nontaxation due to differences in the legal qualification of the taxpayer’s status or the legal qualification of the type of income. Hybrid mismatches arise due to imperfection of legislative techniques and are often accidental, but in some cases hybrid mismatch arrangements act as a way of committing tax offenses, leading to base erosion and profit shifting. The key provisions against the intentional use of hybrid mechanisms aimed at tax avoidance are being specified at the level of national legislations. One of the problems arising out of such norms’ adoption is concluded in providing them with compliance to tax certainty principle, which acts as a guarantee of tax legislation application in accordance with the content of public interest laid down into them, and as the means of protecting the taxpayers’ reasonable expectations at the stage of law enforcement. This article analyzes the existing antihybrid mismatch provisions of the certain foreign tax legislations (on the examples of the United States of America, of the United Kingdom and of the members of the European Union) for their compliance with the tax certainty principle.