Anti-Governemnt Extremism in Australia: Understanding the Australian Anti-Lockdown Freedom Movement as a Complex Anti-Government Social Movement

Learning from Experience?COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories and Their Implications for Democratic Discourse Jennifer Hochschild (bio) and David Beavers (bio) in a survey fielded on march 7, 2020, more than three times as many Democrats as Republicans (61 percent and 20 percent, respectively) agreed that the United States was concealing the true scale of SARS-CoV-2 deaths. Republicans were nearly 20 percentage points more likely than Democrats (57 percent and 38 percent, respectively) to agree that the coronavirus is a man-made epidemic. With fewer than 300 confirmed COVID-19 cases in the United States (CDC 2020), pandemic beliefs with no clear basis in fact were already flourishing and were already colored by Americans' partisan lenses. This case points to large questions. Although research shows that "basically all Americans hold conspiracy beliefs" (Smallpage et al. 2020, 264), we do not know enough about adherence to these beliefs and consequences for American politics. The very concept is contested—one person's plausible hypothesis or praise for imaginative thinking is another's conspiracy theory. But at least for those who see conspiracy theories as a threat to democratic governance, definitions share a few features. Karen Douglas and coauthors define [End Page 859] them as "attempts to explain the ultimate causes of significant social and political events and circumstances with claims of secret plots by two or more powerful actors" (Douglas et al. 2019, 4). Joseph Uscinski and his colleagues, who are among the most influential political scientists writing on this topic, similarly define a conspiracy theory as "a proposed explanation of events that cites as a main causal factor a small group of persons (the conspirators) acting in secret for their own benefit, against the common good" (Uscinski, Klofstad, and Atkinson 2016, 58). Such theories are not new to American politics. Richard Hofstadter set their pejorative framework by "borrowing a clinical term for other purposes" in describing conspiracism as a mental illness ([1964] 2008, 3). Although some argue that conspiracy theories should be analyzed neutrally or even favorably in some circumstances (Butter and Knight 2020a), most analysts of democracy agree with Hofstadter in fearing and condemning them. They worry that conspiracy theories are gaining importance in our era of partisan polarization, hyperpartisan media, disdain for norms of civility and facticity among some political elites, and digital networks' capacity to create "a global network of village idiots" (Lenny Pozner, in Kolbert 2019). Adherence to conspiracy theories might even be deadly. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, exposure to misinformation was associated with increased cases and deaths, most likely by discouraging individuals from wearing masks, socially distancing, and minimizing travel (Ash et al. 2020; Bursztyn et al. 2020). By March 2022, Americans over age 12 who were not vaccinated, sometimes due to acceptance of theories about vaccines' harms to one's body, were 17 times more likely to die from COVID-19 than were those who had received primary vaccines and a booster dose (CDC 2022). Coronavirus-related conspiracy narratives may also undermine democratic discourse and practice. Furious encounters between people with opposing views on COVID-19 are commonplace on- and offline. Patients and their families who deny the disease's existence have spit on and threatened medical staff, and some public health [End Page 860] experts feel under threat (McKay et al. 2020). Belief in a connection between COVID-19 and 5G telecommunications technology was positively associated with state anger and greater justification for violence now or perhaps in the future (Jolley and Paterson 2020). More generally, as one scholar summarizes, "conspiracy theories … have been linked to climate denial, vaccine refusal, political apathy, apathy in the workplace, prejudice, crime, and violence. … Conspiracy theories about COVID-19 are no exception" (Douglas 2021, 271). Despite the fact that some beliefs arguably endanger public health, democratic polities must be cautious about restraining conspiracy narratives. Commitments to freedom of speech and assembly, along with protections for privacy, civil liberty, and freedom from surveillance, make it difficult to balance the need for effective governance and public safety against the imperative of individual freedom. And disagreement about how to attempt the balance itself adds another layer of challenge to democracy. In the survey that we describe and analyze...

Practical recommendations to communicate with patients about health‐related conspiracy theories

The current COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by the circulation of an unprecedented amount of “polluted” information, especially in the social media environment, among which are false narratives and conspiracy theories about both the pandemic and vaccination against COVID-19. The effects of such questionable information primarily concern the lack of compliance with restrictive measures and a negative attitude towards vaccination campaigns, as well as more complex social effects, such as street protests or distrust in governments and authorities in general. Even though there is a lot of scholarly attention given to these narratives in many countries, research about the profile of people who are more prone to believe or spread them is rather scarce. In this context, we investigate the role of age, compared with other socio-demographic factors (such as education and religiosity), as well as the role of the media (the frequency of news consumption, the perceived usefulness of social media, and the perceived incidence of fake information about the virus in the media) and the critical thinking disposition of people who tend to believe such misleading narratives. To address these issues, we conducted a national survey (N = 945) in April 2021 in Romania. Using a hierarchical OLS regression model, we found that people who perceive higher incidence of fake news (ß = 0.33, p < 0.001), find social media platforms more useful (ß = 0.13, p < 0.001), have lower education (ß = −0.17, p < 0.001), and have higher levels of religiosity (ß = 0.08, p < 0.05) are more prone to believe COVID-19-related misleading narratives. At the same time, the frequency of news consumption (regardless of the type of media), critical thinking disposition, and age do not play a significant role in the profile of the believer in conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 pandemic. Somewhat surprisingly, age does not play a role in predicting belief in conspiracy theories, even though there are studies that suggest that older people are more prone to believe conspiracy narratives. As far as media is concerned, the frequency of news media consumption does not significantly differ for believers and non-believers. We discuss these results within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

“We live in an age of conspiracy” says Don DeLillo (1989). In 2014 it seems that conspiracy theories, and speculation concerning the “truth” about major events, has become a popular theme and pastime in contemporary society. From sold out eleven hour David Icke presentations at Wembley Stadium in the UK (as well as his world tours), to the ever expanding radio and television network of Alex Jones in the United States, it is clear that there is more than just a fringe interest in conspiracy theories. In the academic literature dating back to Richard Hofstadter (1964) though, the phenomenon has been cast as a purely pathological or paranoid behaviour. Recent works, such as that of Sunstien and Vermeule (2009), Aaronovitch (2011) and van der Linden (2013) go further in suggesting that engagement with conspiracy theories is not only a pathological behaviour, but a danger both to modern society and one which threatens to bring an end to the “age of reason.” Others however, such as Jane and Fleming (2014) have suggested that conspiracy theories are actually a direct result of Enlightenment thinking, and that they offer a valuable counterweight to modern forms of propaganda. In this thesis I seek to challenge the view that conspiracy theories are a pathological behaviour, and offer instead that in contemporary engagement with conspiracy theories is a form of political resistance that allows the excluded and disaffected a political voice. I also offer that conspiracy theories are best understood as social, cultural and political narratives that are in the words of Michael Barkun (2003) a form of stigmatized knowledge. From this perspective it is possible, I argue, to contextualise conspiracy theories in terms of contemporary political and social issues. Finally, I suggest that conspiracy theories may be a method that is used by those who engage to negotiate social ambivalence as outlined by Bauman (1991). To do this, I interviewed eight Melbournians who were either engaged with conspiracy theories or considered themselves “sceptics.” Each of the participants, shared stories of their everyday experiences with conspiracy theories with me. I have analysed their responses using a thematic narrative analysis and underpinning my research were four research questions: [1] How do people living and working in Melbourne define and use conspiracy theories in their everyday lives?; [2] In my data, are conspiracy theories being discussed (and used) as a form of political action for the alienated and marginalized? [3] Does my data collected conform to the two broad understandings that I have outlined in the literature review (the cultural and psychological approaches)? [4] Following question 3, do my participants engage with conspiracy theories as social, cultural and political narratives that offer a new or alternative means of political resistance?

Although the term conspiracy theory does not appear in my Conspiracy Nar ratives in Roman History, one reviewer remarked, It was hard not to misre member Pagan's title as 'Conspiracy Theories in Ancient Rome.' l Given the preponderance of conspiracies in ancient Rome, conspiracy theory is a reason able expectation; however, so self-evident is the impact of conspiracy on the political life of the Romans that they scarcely engaged in a discourse of con spiracy theory that was not embedded in some response to a specific political crisis. As a modern sociological phenomenon, conspiracy theory was not part of the vocabulary of the ancient Romans; they did not attempt a formal defini tion. Conspiracy demanded action, not theory. Therefore the study of con spiracy theory in ancient Rome demands its own methods?and yields its own results. In this essay I build a model of conspiracy theory based on a wide array of ancient sources and suggest some of the consequences that conspiracy theory had for Roman society. In the absence of a term for conspiracy theory in Latin or Greek, I adopt a sociohistorical approach that moves beyond isolated political events as narrated by individual historians so that I can illustrate how conspiracy forms a substantial part of the Roman mind-set, as evidenced in a variety of

Editorial—The truth is out there: The psychology of conspiracy theories and how to counter them

Digital and social media platforms have facilitated social movements to occur around the globe. The content of social media posts plays a crucial role in sharing cultural messages that resonate with a wider audience. The intersection between social media and disability movements in the Global South during times of crisis, however, remains understudied. Based on an analysis of Vietnamese disability movement organizations’ Facebook posts, this article introduces the concept of a “continuum of contexts” in the content shared by disability movements during the COVID-19 pandemic. Ranging from high, critical, to low contexts, the content respectively signifies the movement’s varying priorities: solidifying a collective identity, advocating for immediate responses to those with disabilities mostly impacted by the pandemic, and staying engaged with the movement’s supporters. Rather than being mutually exclusive, these contexts are interrelated. The article explores the characteristics of each context and examines their implications for the organization of social movements during a crisis.

Conspiracy theories are a ubiquitous phenomenon in the socio-political discussion. By trusting these theories, society justifies possible events like the COVID-19 pandemic. Through mixed methods research, the article seeks to provide the amount of page-generated and user-generated conspiratorial content that links chemtrails with the COVID-19 pandemic, along with audience-generated feedback on social media content. Facebook and Reddit have been chosen for this research because of their inherently contrasting approaches to content regulation. Facebook’s content moderation tools lacked the impact to remove misinformation, as only 8% of content was flagged as false information. Additionally, even if researched subreddits had two times the amount of relevant content in comparison to relevant Facebook pages, most of the content had 0 upvotes, meaning that the content was either negatively received or lacked adequate support. Serbian-speaking Facebook users expressed support for conspiratorial content on this platform, while Serbian redditors used conspiratorial narratives to ridicule conspiracy theorists. Likes were the most utilized type of feedback on content of relevant Facebook pages, while comments were the most utilized type of feedback on content of relevant subreddits. The importance of this research lies in understanding what conspiratorial narratives try to imply through social media and how the audience interprets and communicates with this content. Keywords: conspiracy theories, social media, chemtrails, pandemic, COVID-19

Conspiracy theories are attracting increasing attention from political scientists, much of it negative. Three recent books, from the disciplines of political science, cultural history and social theory, provide a valuable critical corrective. Uscinski and Parent argue that conspiracy theories are connected to partisan distrust and are largely stable across the twentieth century. Michael Butter uses detailed historical cases from the Puritan witch trials to the Red Scare of the 1950s to show the central and influential role that conspiratorial beliefs have played in American history. Luc Boltanski focuses on conspiracy narratives in early detective and spy novels, but situates them in a broader account of the relation between the state, the social and political sciences, and popular representations of political power. Taken together, these books place the problem of conspiracy theory firmly in the context of democratic politics, opening important empirical and conceptual questions about partisanship, populism, publicity and secrecy. Boltanski, L. (2014) Mysteries and Conspiracies: Detective Stories, Spy Novels and the Making of Modern Societies. Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge: Polity Press. Butter, M. (2014) Plots, Designs and Schemes: American Conspiracy Theories from the Puritans to the Present. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Uscinski, J. E. and Parent, J. M. (2014) American Conspiracy Theories. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Part I Definitions and approaches Introduction Todor Hristov, Andrew McKenzie-McHarg and Alejandro Romero Reche 1. Conceptual history and conspiracy theory Andrew McKenzie-McHarg 2. Conspiracy theory in historical, cultural and literary studies Peter Knight and Michael Butter 3. Semiotic Approaches to Conspiracy Theories Massimo Leone, Mari-Liis Madison and Andreas Ventsel 4. Philosophy and conspiracy theories Juha Raikka and Juho Ritola 5. Psychoanalysis, critical theory and conspiracy theory Nebojsa Blanusa and Todor Hristov 6. Conspiracy theory as occult cosmology in anthropology Annika Rabo 7. Sociology, social theory and conspiracy theory Turkay Salim Nefes and Alejandro Romero Reche 8. Conspiracy theories in political science and political theory Julien Giry and Pranvera Tika 9. Social psychology of conspiracy theory Olivier Klein and Kenzo Nera 10. Social network analysis, social big data and conspiracy theories Estrella Gualda Caballero Part II Psychological factors Introduction Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Karen Douglas, Aleksandra Cichocka and Michal Bilewicz 1. Personality traits, cognitive styles and worldviews associated with beliefs in conspiracy theories Anthony Lantian, Michael Wood and Biljana Gjoneska 2. Social-cognitive processes underlying belief in conspiracy theories Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Olivier Klein and Jasna Milosevic Dordevicz 3. Motivations, emotions and belief in conspiracy theories Karen M. Douglas, Aleksandra Cichocka and Robbie M. Sutton 4. Conspiracy theories as psycho-political reactions to perceived power Roland Imhoff and Pia Lamberty 5. How conspiracy theories spread Adrian Bangerter, Pascal Wagner-Egger and Sylvain Delouvee 6. Conspiracy theories and intergroup relations Mikey Biddlestone, Aleksandra Cichocka, Iris Zezelj and Michal Bilewicz 7. Consequences of conspiracy theories Daniel Jolley, Silvia Mari and Karen Douglas 8. Countering conspiracy theories and misinformation Peter Kreko Part III Society and politics Introduction Eirikur Bergmann, Asbjorn Dyrendal, Jaron Harambam and Hulda Thorisdottir 1. Who are the conspiracy theorists? Demographics and conspiracy theories Steven M. Smallpage, Hugo Drochon, Joseph E. Uscinski and Casey Klofstad 2. Conspiracy theory entrepreneurs, movements and individuals Jaron Harambam 3. Conspiracy theories and gender and sexuality Annika Thiem 4. Conspiracy theories, political ideology and political behaviour Hulda Thorisdottir, Silvia Mari and Andre Krouwel 5. Functions and uses of conspiracy theories in authoritarian regimes Julien Giry and Dogan Gurpinar 6. Conspiracy theory and populism Eirikur Bergman and Michael Butter 7. Radicalisation and conspiracy theories Benjamin Lee 8. Antisemitism and conspiracism Kjetil Braut Simonsen 9. Conspiracy theory and religion Asbjorn Dyrendal Part IV Media and transmission Introduction Stef Aupers, Dana Craciun and Andreas OEnnerfors 1. Rumours, urban legends and the verbal transmission of conspiracy theories Anastasiya Astapova 2. Conspiracy theorising and the history of media in the eighteenth century Andrew McKenzie-McHarg and Claus Oberhauser 3. Genres of conspiracy in nineteenth-century British writing Ben Carver 4. Conspiracy in American narrative Timothy Melley 5. Conspiracy theories and visual culture Ute Caumanns and Andreas OEnnerfors 6. Conspiracy theories in film and television shows Michael Butter 7. Decoding mass media / encoding conspiracy theory Stef Aupers 8. The Internet and the spread of conspiracy content Simona Stano 9. Networked disinformation and the lifecycle of online conspiracy theories Hugo Leal 10. Conspiracy theories and fake news Kiril Avramov, Vasily Gatov and Ilya Yablokov Part V Histories and regions Introduction Ilya Yablokov, Pascal Girard, Nebojsa Blanusa and Annika Rabo 1. Conspiracy theories in the Roman empire Victoria Emma Pagan 2. Conspiracy theories in the Middle Ages and the early modern period Cornel Zwierlein 3. Freemasons, Illuminati and Jews: Conspiracy theories and the French Revolution Claus Oberhauser 4. Conspiracy Theories in Europe during the twentieth century Pascal Girard 5. Conspiracy theories in Putin's Russia: the case of the 'New World Order' Ilya Yablokov 6. Conspiracy theories in and about the Balkans Nebojsa Blanusa 7. Conspiracy theories in Turkey Dogan Gurpinar and Turkay Salim Nefes 8. Conspiracy theories in the Middle East Matthew Gray 9. Conspiracy theories in Southeast Asia Viren Swami, Hanoor Syahirah Zahari and David Barron 10. Conspiracy theories in American history Michael Butter 11. Populism and conspiracy theory in Latin America: a case study of Venezuela Rosanne Norris Hooper

Watchman on the Tower: Ezra Taft Benson and the Making of the Mormon Right

This article presents the results of a comparative research study on belief in COVID-19-related conspiracy theories among social science students in Poland and the Czech Republic. The study investigates the relationship between susceptibility to disinformation and factors such as religiosity, trust in science, and the evaluation of institutional responses to the pandemic. Using a quantitative approach (CAPI survey), the authors identify notable differences between the two national groups, with Polish students showing a greater inclination toward conspiracy narratives. The article also explores correlations between such beliefs and negative assessments of the EU’s actions. The findings highlight the role of cultural context and psychological predispositions in shaping attitudes toward health-related misinformation, underlining the need for further research into the social and political consequences of the infodemic. The study contributes to political science by linking disinformation susceptibility with systemic trust and civic attitudes in Central Europe.

Humans seem drawn to dark conspiracy theories, often in favor of the simple truth In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, misinformation and conspiracy theorizing have surged President Trump, for example, praised the antimalarial drug hydroxychloroquine as a "game changer" despite scant empirical evidence of its efficacy and safety for the treatment of SARS-CoV-2 Others in the administration have promoted the unsubstantiated theory that SARS-CoV-2 originated in a Chinese lab, despite scientific consensus that the virus likely originated in an animal source before zoonotic transfer and that no evidence indicates that the virus emerged through deliberate lab manipulation of a related virus Here, Friedman discusses why humans are vulnerable to conspiracy theories

Conspiracy Theories, Mistrust Take Root During Pandemic

The COVID-19 outbreak has been accompanied by a massive infodemic: an overabundance of information, some accurate and some not. At this pandemic we have seen a large scale of fake news and misinformation, leading to anti-vaccine, anti-mask, and anti-5G protests.1 Fake news is intentionally misleading and deceptive news that is written and published with the intent to damage an entity or a person. They may contain false, misleading, imposter, manipulated or fabricated content. Much of the discourse on fake news conflates three notions, named "information disorders": (a) Misinformation: false information someone shares without knowing it's untrue, (b) Disinformation: false information that's shared with the intention to harm or mislead, and (c) Malinformation: true information that's used to harm others.2 False beliefs generally arise through the same mechanisms that establish accurate beliefs. People appear to encode all new information as if it were true and later tag the information as being either true or false. Different cognitive, social and affective factors lead people to form or endorse misinformed views. The emotional content of the information shared also affects false-belief formation. An angry mood can boost misinformation sharing, while social exclusion, which is likely to induce a negative mood, can increase susceptibility to conspiratorial content.3 As shown by the Illusory Truth Effect, repeated exposure to an article, whether real or fake, increases people's perceptions of its accuracy. In social media, falsehood seems to diffuse significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information, and the effects are more pronounced for false political news than for false news about terrorism, natural disasters, and science. Moreover, although prior knowledge of a statement leads people to confirm the statement the next time, they see it (confirmation bias), novelty facilitates decision making since it updates our understanding of the world.4 The fitness value of accurate information seems so obvious, while self-deception seems to threaten such hard-won informational gains. Then, why has not it selected out? The American evolutionary biologist and sociobiologist Robert Trivers5 suggested that although our senses have evolved to give us an exquisitely detailed perception of the outside world, as soon as that information hits our brains, it often becomes biased and distorted, usually without conscious effort. Why should this be so? For Trivers, the evolutionary origins of the human propensity for self-deception lie in the adaptive benefits of deceiving others. An animal becomes a better liar when it believes its own lies, or we deceive ourselves the better to deceive others. Deception in animals is the transmission of misinformation by one animal to another, and natural selection favors deceptive signaling when aggression either confers a great benefit to signalers or imposes a great cost to receivers.6 In humans, self-deception process may have a protective role against depression, while depression on its own may reduce mechanisms of self-deception.7, 8 Humans are biased information-seekers that prefer to receive information that confirms their values and worldviews. Maybe, this is why myths and conspiracy theories around COVID-19 and vaccines exist. We may suggest that underlined neuropsychological processes, probably based on biologically determined self- or other-deceptive mechanisms, may serve in the development, and even the conservation, of at least some of the social behaviors related to the fake news phenomenon. These mechanisms may support the human tendency for biased information-seeking, and even the evolutionary persistence of the fake news phenomenon.9 However, in cases such as of COVID-19 pandemic, the native urge to deceive ourselves and others is not without risk. Beliefs in COVID-19-related conspiracy narratives and fake news are negatively associated with vaccination willingness and infection-preventive behavior.1 The COVID-19 pandemic and associated infodemic have magnified the underlying problem of trust. The vaccine hesitancy is primarily a trust issue rather than an informational problem. Fake news, rumors and conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and vaccines should not be understood only as false beliefs, but also as indicators of popular anxieties and fears. Stress inoculation treatment can help people prepare for subsequent misinformation exposure and to increase misinformation detection.10 Finally, policymakers are advised to build information literacy skills for different levels and environments, and to move away from polarization attitudes and behaviors.