Anthropological objects and negation

Abstract

Ever since Kant, the possibility of having objects of knowledge has been one of the most basic anthropological questions (“what can I know?”). For the logician, the linguist, or the semiologist who studies natural language, negation is one of these objects. However, as an operation and as a symbol, it has the paradoxical property of not being able to be objectivized in the discourse that treats it without being used in this construction. Of course, it is an entirely general problem that it is not possible to have a “distant view” of symbolism without using a symbolism of some sort or another. Anthropology is essentially concerned with such objects. The descriptions of ethnologists are thus fertile ground for the epistemologist who believes, like Aristotle, that non-being is not and therefore that, even though in fact we speak only of things (otherwise, what good is speaking?) our discourse cannot be a copy of them.