Antecedents, Consequences And Control Of Opportunistic Behavior In Strategic Networks

Abstract

In the Strategic Management literature, the problem of cooperation arising from conflicts of interest has been described as the problem of motivation. Under assumptions of self-interest, or its stronger forms (such as opportunism), collectively beneficial outcomes do not result for because of the actions motivated by the self interests of individual members. In this paper, the author presents a host of antecedents that can spur and/or facilitate such opportunistic pursuits in members of a strategic network. The influence of these antecedents has been reflected in the ex-ante and ex-post phases of network life cycle. It is postulated that the problem can be resolved by securing an alignment in partners’ interest which together with alignment in actions contributes to the bottom line through increased ability to yield an integrated response to the adaptation requirements stemming from disturbances in networks’ environment. A detailed discussion been administered on how opportunism can be controlled through formal measures like contracts, TSIs, vertical integration and game theoretic stipulations, and the informal controls like relational norms, identification, and culmination of trust and commitment.