Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the ‘practical syllogisms’ that Anscombe acknowledges in her early and late works are fundamentally different from ‘practical syllogisms’ in Kant’s sense and that she is a skeptic about the possibility of the latter. A practical syllogism in Anscombe’s sense can be valid without being sound, does not reveal the action in the conclusion to be logically compelled, and is indifferent to the motives from which the agent acts. By contrast, Kantian practical syllogisms are self-conscious acts of knowing what I ought to do, reveal an action to be necessitated by reason, and derive an action from motives of reason.
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