Anonymous Welfarism, Critical-Level Principles, and the Repugnant and Sadistic Conclusions

Abstract

Abstract Welfarist population principles rank alternatives using information regarding the lifetime well-being of those that ever live, disregarding non-welfare information. Standard examples are classical (total) utilitarianism, average utilitarianism, and critical-level utilitarianism. A population principle implies Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion if every alternative in which each individual’s lifetime well-being exceeds the level that corresponds to a neutral life is ranked as worse than some other alternative with a larger population in which everyone alive has a lifetime well-being above neutrality but arbitrarily close to it. As is well known, total utilitarianism implies the Repugnant Conclusion but average utilitarianism and critical-level utilitarianism with a critical level above neutrality do not. Because critical-level utilitarianism also has several other desirable properties, this class of population principles can be viewed as an attractive candidate for avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion. This chapter discusses some important characteristics of the critical-level (generalized) utilitarian principles and compares them to alternative proposals. In addition to the Repugnant Conclusion, Arrhenius’s Sadistic Conclusion is examined. Critical-level utilitarianism with a critical level above neutrality implies the Sadistic Conclusion. It is illustrated that it is impossible to obtain a population principle that avoids both of these conclusions, provided that some additional plausible requirements are imposed. Thus, the chapter illustrates one of the difficult trade-offs that are common in population ethics.