Abstract
Anonymous authentication schemes, mostly based on the notion of group signatures, allow a group member to obtain membership from a server and gain access rights if the member can prove their authenticity to the verifier. However, existing authentication schemes are impractical because they neglect to provide an exclusive verification of the blacklist. In addition, the schemes are unaware of malicious members who are involved in privilege transferring. In this paper, a novel membership authentication scheme providing detection of membership transfer and proof of membership exclusiveness to the blacklist is proposed.
Highlights
The rapid development of the Internet has resulted in an increase in electronic transactions that allow users to buy goods or services from online platforms provided by Internet companies, including Google, Facebook, eBay, and Twitter
Mostly based on the notion of group signatures, allow a group member to obtain membership from a server and gain access rights if the member can prove their authenticity to the verifier
As proven by the fact that some members have been revoked, in contrast to the use of fixed time periods [12] by employing a one-way chain, Ateniese et al [13] require group members to prove that their membership does not appear on the current certificate revocation list (CRL)
Summary
The rapid development of the Internet has resulted in an increase in electronic transactions that allow users to buy goods or services from online platforms provided by Internet companies, including Google, Facebook, eBay, and Twitter. Several provably secure authentication schemes [8] [9] [10] [11] have been proposed to create anonymous memberships in which any member of a group can prove to the service provider (i.e., the verifier) that they are qualified to access a service or file; these schemes are impractical because they do not provide exclusive verification of revoked memberships. State-of-the-art authentication schemes provide few revocation methods without describing how to detect malicious members’ illegal behavior; in other words, such schemes are unaware of malicious members who have been involved in privilege transfer. Traitor tracing was first suggested by [14], which discusses how to identify a traitor in a public key cryptographic scheme and proposes some approaches for revoking access rights for at least one of the traitors involved in illegal privilege transfer.
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