Abstract
Smart grid has emerged as the next-generation electricity grid with power flow optimization and high power quality. Smart grid technologies have attracted the attention of industry and academia in the last few years. However, the tradeoff between security and efficiency remains a challenge in the practical deployment of the smart grid. Most recently, Li et al. proposed a lightweight message authentication scheme with user anonymity and claimed that their scheme is provably secure. But we found that their scheme fails to achieve mutual authentication and mitigate some typical attacks (e.g., impersonation attack, denial of service attack) in the smart grid environment. To address these drawbacks, we present a new message authentication scheme with reasonable efficiency. Security and performance analysis results show that the proposed scheme can satisfy the security and lightweight requirements of practical implementations and deployments of the smart grid.
Highlights
The explosive growth in mobile data services has paved the way for wireless communications to be achieved with lower energy consumption, higher throughout, and better quality of service [1]
At the consumer’s side, the device communicating with the neighborhood gateway is the smart meter which is resource-constrained and is responsible for collecting the electricity consumption reports through its connection with various household appliances
Shen et al designed two lightweight authentication protocols and a group key establishment algorithm between sensor nodes and personal digital assistants for wireless body area networks [30, 31]. Their proposed protocols were aimed at resource-constrained devices and they can be applied to smart grid systems
Summary
The explosive growth in mobile data services has paved the way for wireless communications to be achieved with lower energy consumption, higher throughout, and better quality of service [1]. (ii) Important security properties or functions are not provided by these schemes: these schemes have various vulnerabilities that can be exploited in different types of attacks to the smart grid networks, such as the impersonation attack and denial of service attack Some of these schemes cannot provide secure mutual authentication, key agreement, and user anonymity. These limitations seriously hinder their practical deployment and implementation in the smart grid environment. Li et al [5] proposed an anonymous and lightweight message authentication scheme for smart grids They only used some very lightweight cryptographic operations in their scheme, e.g., bitwise XOR operation and one-way hash functions. We make some concluding remarks in the last section
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
