Abstract
ABSTRACT Drawing on material from Husserlian phenomenology, we can reconstruct a realist version of anomalous monism (rAM). According to such a view, mental events are identical to some physical events because they simultaneously exemplify mental and physical properties. rAM would have to confront the charge of epiphenomenalism because Husserl rejects psychophysical causal interaction. And as a form of nonreductive physicalism, rAM also faces the challenge of Kim’s supervenience argument and explanatory exclusion. Utilizing Husserl’s conception of mental motivation and contemporary elaborations of substance causation, rAM can refute the accusation of epiphenomenalism and overcome the problem of exclusion.
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