Abstract
In "Human-Animal Chimeras: The Moral Insignificance of Uniquely Human Capacities," Julian Koplin argues against the views that all uniquely human traits have moral significance or that all the traits humans have in common with other animals "are morally insignificant." He recommends instead the adoption of "a better framework for thinking about the moral status of part-human beings," one that emphasizes the "phenomenal value (or disvalue)" chimeric animals are likely "to enjoy (or suffer)." If the moral status of these chimeric animals is grounded in the phenomenal value of their interests-that is, their interests as nonhuman animals-current protections for animals used in research may be inadequate to protect those interests.
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