Anger, Bargaining, and Mobilization as Middle-Range Theories of Elite Conflict Behavior

Abstract

Recent studies of political conflict are in agreement on at least three points: theories of conflict should incorporate analyses of individual decisions; political elites play a critical role in structuring conflict; and specialized forms of conflict behavior should be identified.1 Theorists continue to disagree over the available models of motivation and decision. Much work in the field seems committed to a single line of explanation. Emphasis is on conflict participants either as angry men or as strategic bargainers. An alternative is to consider anger and strategy as bases for middle-range theories, each explaining certain aspects of conflict behavior. The very distinctiveness of some forms of conflict action should alert us to this possibility.2 We need not assume that anger underlies all conflict behavior. Rather, we can see how theories of anger may explain individuals' decisions to engage in certain types of conflict activity, and how anger may interact with other variables also shaping such decisions. The present study develops three theories about the middle linkages which shape elite conflict behavior. These alternative formulations are tested with data on the partisan conflict activity of leaders in Austrian communities. Given the difficulty of elite access and the great contextual differences which often characterize elite decision-making situations, the opportunity to draw on interviews with party elites in fifty constitutionally identical and organizationally similar decision-making arenas is useful. We do not argue that findings at this level can be generalized without qualification to other sites of conflict. But if different middle-range theories are needed to explain various forms of conflict in such a most similar systems design, the general argument that we must diversify our explanatory strategies becomes more persuasive.3