Abstract

The authors reject the use of anencephalic infants as organ donors, favoring the present policy that vital organs may not be removed from the living to benefit others and that whole brain death is considered morally and legally the death of the person. They refute the proposition that lack of higher brain function defines brain death and that presence of higher brain function is a condition for personhood. Such a policy would be consistent with the use of infants with other severe brain pathology or with patients in chronic vegetative states as organ donors. Arras and Shinnar conclude that "admirable goals should not be advanced by improper means."

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