Andalus and Sefarad: On Philosophy and Its History in Islamic Spain by Sarah Stroumsa (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: Andalus and Sefarad: On Philosophy and Its History in Islamic Spain by Sarah Stroumsa Oliver Leaman Sarah Stroumsa. Andalus and Sefarad: On Philosophy and Its History in Islamic Spain. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019. xvii + 220 pp. doi:10.1017/S0364009420000264 Admirers of Sarah Stroumsa's work, and I count myself among them, will not be disappointed by this book. It builds on a collection of her recent work on the culture of al-Andalus, and in particular on the thought of the Jews and Muslims who lived in the region from the eighth to the fifteenth centuries. The precise nature of their interaction remains a mystery, despite her careful sifting through of the evidence we have today, such as it is. Thinkers were rather sparse in their references to other thinkers in the region, although it is often entirely obvious that they were in fact discussing their work and employing their ideas. I am not sure there is anything very new in this book, but there is a mass of careful [End Page 439] detail and discussion on the cultural context and its wider political background that illuminates our understanding of this period. In particular, Stroumsa establishes beyond question that there was a shared Andalusi consciousness between Jewish and Muslim intellectuals, a feeling of cultural superiority, perhaps, over other parts of the Jewish and Islamic world. The detail of the discussion is impressive. Stroumsa ranges from a wider account of Islamicate culture to the culture that flourished in al-Andalus; the different schools of thought; the physical resources, and who used them; the Muʿtazilah, Karaites, and Zahiris; the role of Neoplatonism and mysticism; and much more. The competing philosophical positions are well articulated and Stroumsa sheds new light on their differences and points of interest. On the other hand, although many Jewish and Muslim thinkers were undoubtedly engaged in a common exercise, it was always clear who was in charge of the project, and it was not the Jews. It is unknown how much, if any, Jewish material was ever read or considered by their Muslim peers. As in most cases where there is a dominant and subordinate culture, the former tends to ignore the latter, which only increases the ardor of the latter for the former, of course. There is a lot in the book on the question of influence, on how one thinker influenced others, on how political changes influenced thinkers, and how a particular doctrine played a role in the construction of an intellectual climate. I am often suspicious of this sort of language. Its looseness is never more apparent than in chapter 5, on Aristotelianism in al-Andalus. We are told that the thought of Averroes and Maimonides was distinctly marked by the Almohad movement that took over the region in the twelfth century. Stroumsa makes this claim of influence many times in this chapter, but by page 148 we might start to doubt these assertions, since we are told that Averroes rejected the Almohad policy on the indoctrination of the masses, by contrast with Maimonides, who accepted it. How could they both be influenced by something that they took contrary positions on? It is like two people asking someone which path they should take, and one subsequently goes left and the other right. We are informed, quite rightly, that the Almohad doctrine was based on Ibn Tumart and his attempt, like all religious reformers, to produce a basic set of principles that embodies the essence of the correct religion, and Averroes in his legal work emphasizes the role of general legal principles, while Maimonides of course bases his Mishneh Torah on such principles, which he uses to upend many traditional ways of resolving issues in Jewish law. By contrast, the earlier regime criticized by the Almohads, the Almoravids, were said to have used the Maliki madhab to emphasize case law rather than general principles. Jewish law also was based on a complex set of ideas and arguments and examples, which Maimonides replaced with his own rulings, based on what he argued are the fundamental principles of Judaism. It is a tempting narrative. The Almohads had principles that they transmitted to...