Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of Homonyma

Abstract

Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of Homonyma JOHN P. ANTON Tins MAIN PURPOSE OF TinS PAPER is to offeran exposition and a criticalexamination of the ancient interpretationsof Aristotle'sdoctrine of homonym. A circumlocution of what Aristotle means by homonym things is given in Categories, Ch. I Ia. The ancient interpretationswith which we are concerned in this paper are to be found in the extant commentaries on this treatise.Evidently, more commentaries had been written on the Categoriesthan the vicissitudesof time allowed to survive, but we have only those of the following writers: Porphyrius (c: 233-303), Dexippus (ft.c. 350), Ammonius (ft.C. 485), Philoponus (c.490-530), Olympiodorus (ft.c. 535), $implicius (ft.c. 533), Elias (ft.c. 550). One might add here the relevant writings of John Damascene (675-749), Photius (820-891), and Michael Psellus (1018-1079), which are useful paraphrases rather than fullcommentaries; for that reason the interpretationsthey support are not discussed in thispaper. The main body of this paper is given to a discussion of the interpretations which the ancient commentators offered and to an analysis of the assumptions which underlie them. It can be stated here in anticipation of what follows that the commentators often attached to Aristotle'smeaning of homonyma aspects that were quite foreign to his views and that by doing so these commentators were taking extensive libertieswith the text at hand. As we hope to show, the commentators brought into their discussions of this particular portion of the Categoriesissues and views that were far more relevant to theirown ontologies and logical theories than to Aristotle'sdoctrines. In order to show how this is the case, we must first give a summary of what we believe our textpermits us to say about the meaning of homonym, as given in the opening chapter of the Categories. ~ Suffice it to add This is the second of a two-part article. This part is based on an invited paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy in New York City, Dec. 27, 1965. a For a full discussion of the doctrine of homonyma and the background against which it can be understood, see my "The Aristotelian Doctrine of Homonyma in the Categories and its Platonic Antecedents," in the last number of this journal (VI, 4 [Oct., 1968], 315-326). I tried to show in that paper how Aristotle's formulation is indebted linguistically to Plato but was worked out not in response to Plato's usage but to his own philosophical position and as part of his logical apparatus to attack the Speusippean wing of the Academy. On the whole, the textual evidence from the Platonic writings indicates clearly that Plato had not proposed a technical use of homonyma. Speusippus and Aristotle, however, offered two different and opposing technical formulations intended to fit their respective ontologies. [H 2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY at this point that the interpretations of the doctrine of homonyma with which we are concerned here are only those that are discussed exclusively in the relevant commentaries on this work. Textual tradition has preserved two versions, referred to here as Vl and 3/2, of Aristotle's formulation of homonyma. The difference between them is that while V1 preserves the key expression ),d,yJ~.~ o6~(~, the other, V2, omits it. V1, as established by modern textual criticism, reads: 'Ol~6wtzce My~'~cct~o~~vollQc,~6vo~xow~, 6 ~ xc~Sc~o~vo~ccM'l,o~~ o6~(c~;~'~po;. Not only did we defend the inclusion of the expression logos t~s ousias (hereafter abbreviated as L of O) as indispensable for distinguishing Aristofle's formulation from the one propounded by Speusippus, but we also found it necessary to advance the view that Aristotle used the expression L of O in a definitely technical sense. We showed why the deletion of the term ousia would make the passage open to misinterpretation, since by omitting it one could argue that Aristofle meant to include in the class of homonyma such things as accidental properties and individuals with proper names. We also argued in favor of a view that delimits the meaning of ousia to definable substance, i.e., in the...