Anchoring and Judgment Bias: Disregarding Under Uncertainty.

Abstract

The current investigation examined the nature of the cognitive processes that underlie decision-making behavior. The focus of this project centered on the effects of utilizing heuristics that pertain to the availability of information stored in memory. Anchoring effects demonstrate that people will use any available information sampled from memory as a reference for making judgments of frequency. The specific aim of the experiment was to examine whether people exhibit patterns of behavior consistent with anchoring effects, revealed by corrupted subjective judgments, despite explicit notice of instruction to disregard the experimenter-supplied information (the anchor). Subjects failed to demonstrate an ability to disregard a relatively high anchor even when the instruction to do so was explicit. However, in contrast, subjects demonstrated an ability to disregard a relatively low anchor. More broadly, subjects instructed to disregard demonstrated a reduced effect of anchoring. Implications are considered within the context of the availability heuristic and the directly related effects of anchoring. The results may be interpreted within the framework of a dual-process model, two-system view that distinguishes intuition from reasoning. The present findings fit with well-supported theoretical explanations of anchoring effects, such as selective accessibility and numerical priming.