Abstract

With a sponsored content plan on the Internet market, a content provider (CP) negotiates with the Internet service providers (ISPs) on behalf of the end-users to remove the network subscription fees. In this work, we have studied the impact of data sponsoring plans on the decision-making strategies of the ISPs and the CPs in the telecommunications market. We develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers (CPs and ISPs), where the CPs sponsor content. We formulate the interactions between the ISPs and between the CPs as a noncooperative game. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning the Nash equilibrium. Finally, extensive simulations show the convergence of a proposed schema to the Nash equilibrium and show the effect of the sponsoring content on providers’ policies.

Highlights

  • One of the principal trends on the Internet in the last few years is the explosion in demand for cellular data usage.erefore, one of the main challenges for content provider (CP) is how to motivate end-users to access their content to achieve a higher profit

  • Sponsoring data have recently been subject to modeling and analysis in the literature. e authors in [5] proposed a novel joint optimization approach of a Stackelberg contract game to characterize the market-oriented model for sponsored content market and to capture the interactions among the Internet service providers (ISPs), CPs, and end-users. ey have developed a Stackelberg game, where the ISP acts as the leader and the CPs and end-users act as the followers

  • In [13], the authors studied the sponsorship competition among CPs in the Internet content market and demonstrated that the competitions improve the welfare of the ISP and the CP. e authors in [3] considered a sponsored data market with one ISP, one CP, and a set of end-users. ey have modeled the interactions among three entities as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the ISP and the CP act as the leaders determining the pricing and sponsoring strategies, respectively, in the first stage and the end-users act as the followers deciding on their data demand in the second stage

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Summary

Introduction

One of the principal trends on the Internet in the last few years is the explosion in demand for cellular data usage. E authors in [5] proposed a novel joint optimization approach of a Stackelberg contract game to characterize the market-oriented model for sponsored content market and to capture the interactions among the ISPs, CPs, and end-users. E authors in [7] analyzed the interactions of three network entities, i.e., the end-users, the ISPs, and the CP, based on the game theory. Ey have modeled the interactions among three entities as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the ISP and the CP act as the leaders determining the pricing and sponsoring strategies, respectively, in the first stage and the end-users act as the followers deciding on their data demand in the second stage. E main objective of this paper is to study a sponsored content market consists of multiple CPs, multiple ISPs, and end-users, with the time constraint using game theory.

Problem Modeling
Game Analysis
Numerical Investigations
Conclusion
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